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The Status of a Creditor
as a 'Controlling Person'
By Joseph W. Bartlett* and Philip S. Lapatin**

"A dominating influence may be exerted in other ways than by vote."
BENJAMIN CARDOZO'

"A bank undeniably has a clearright in respect of each individualtransaction to making proper conditions looking toward the security and repayment of the loan: that is its business."
ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR.2
The growing ingenuity of plaintiffs' counsel in security regulation matters and the current legal trend toward redistributing the burden of loss
to those best able to absorb it have together reopened the frontiers of legal
liability and introduced much uncertainty to areas which were once securely governed by the individualistic philosophy of the early common
law.' One of the liveliest and most troublesome questions to appear in this
regard concerns the obligations of a creditor to protect the public from his
debtor's misconduct. The nature of this problem can usefully be illustrated
by the following hypothetical situation:'
Company A, a closely-held manufacturing concern, approaches Bank B
in order to acquire needed funds for a program of capital expansion. After
reviewing Company A's operations, Bank B agrees to extend a one million
dollar loan for a maximum term of five years subject, however, to several
terms and conditions. All funds advanced must be invested according to a
general plan developed jointly between bank officials and company management. Prior to repayment Company A will be restricted from engaging
in any activity beyond the ordinary course of its business, changing the
composition of its board of directors, or generally allowing its net worth to
fall below a stated figure. In addition, Company A is affirmatively required
* Partner in the firm of Gaston Snow & Ely Bartlett, Boston, Massachusetts. Harvard
College (A.B., 1955); Stanford University (LL.B., 1960). President, Boston Bar Association.
** Partner in the firm of Gaston Snow & Ely Bartlett, Boston, Massachusetts. Cornell
University (B.A., 1970); Boston University (J.D., 1973).
1. Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378,379-80 (1918).
2. Berle, Banking Under the Antitrust Laws, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 589, 603-604 (1949).
3. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §69 at 459 (4th ed. 1971).
4. The facts set forth above are based generally on an unreported action in which the
authors' law firm participated.
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to follow auditing and insurance practices acceptable to Bank B and to
enter into employment contracts with key officers at fixed salaries for the
term of the loan. It is understood that within the five year period Company
A will offer stock to the public and use a portion of the sale proceeds to
repay Bank B.
Subsequently, when the expansion program appears to have enhanced
the profit ability of Company A, the public offering takes place as planned
and a minority interest in Company A is sold through underwriters, thus
enabling a substantial portion of the loan to be repaid. Shortly thereafter,
however, the directors learn that Company A's earnings had been materially overstated by management and improperly certified by the company's
accountants. These poor judgmerits are sufficiently serious to force Company A to seek protection under federal bankruptcy procedures. The price
of the newly-issued shares dwindles to a nominal amount, and the purchasers seek legal redress.
A direct action against the issuer, its directors and accountants appears5
to have definite substantive merit under §11 of the Securities Act of 1933.
That section was designed to protect investors by imposing civil liabilities
as a result of any false or misleading registration statement and would
probably apply to the misstatements of earnings contained in Company
A's prospectus. Despite the likelihood of a favorable judgment, however,
there is reason to believe that neither the management, none of whom are
men of substance, nor the accountants, who are a small independent firm
of doubtful solvency, will be able to respond in monetary damages. For this
reason, the investors join Bank B as a defendant, relying on §15 of the
Securities Act, which provides in essence that any person in control of a
party liable under §11 may also be liable to the same extent as the controlled party. 6 It is argued that the control relationship was established and
effectuated through the variety of restrictions and covenants imposed upon
Company A by Bank.B as conditions to the advance of capital.
5. 15 U.S.C.A. §77k (1971) [hereinafter cited as Securities Act]. For many years prior
to the adoption of this legislation, many corporations had offered their stock without making
information available regarding their actual financial and directive situations. As a result,
unenlightened investors often made purchases which ultimately resulted in great financial
loss. The primary objective of the Securities Act of 1933 was to protect investors by requiring
full and fair disclosure of material facts concerning securities publicly offered, and by preventing misrepresentation and fraud in their sale. W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 1296 (4th ed. 1969).
6. 15 U.S.C.A. §77o (1971). The exact language of this section is as follows: "Every person
who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one or more other persons by or through stock
ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable under sections 77k or 771 of this
title, shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled
person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person
had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of
which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist."
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Moreover, the investors add a second count to their complaint against
Bank B, contending that under common law tort principles the bank,
because of its position, occupied a special relationship to Company A
which made it responsible to verify the statements appearing in the prospectus and to answer in damages to anyone who was eventually misled
thereby.
The issues raised by the investors' charges against Bank B are complex
but vital, particularly in a time of recession and restrictive credit policies.
To the extent that financiers are tempted to take advantage of a favorable
bargaining position in order to command a share in the profit-making
enterprises of their debtors, they may, despite notions prevalent at early
common law, become saddled with a concomitant obligation to protect
society when the expected profits fail to materialize or when the debtor
otherwise engages in harmful conduct. On the other hand, a lending institution which simply desires an additional measure of protection to insure
repayment because of troubled economic conditions generally should not
be penalized for its understandable degree of caution.
The development of this distinction and its proposed use as a means for
resolving the fate of Bank B, is the subject of this article. Emerging
common-law doctrines, which have been able to consider the problem
unfettered by specific statutory guidelines, are a first source of inquiry,
ultimately revealing those principles with which to gauge the legislative
intent underlying the Securities Act.

I.

COMMON-LAW PRINCIPLES

The obligation to exercise control over the conduct of third persons is an
element of the general duty which arises in many situations to take reasonable precautions for the care of others.' At early common law, the courts
were far too occupied with the more flagrant forms of misbehavior to be
greatly concerned with one who merely did nothing, even though another
might suffer harm because of his omission to act.8 During the last century,
however, this highly individualistic notion has slowly been replaced, and
liability for "nonfeasance" has been extended to a group of relations in
which custom, public sentiment and views of social policy have led the
courts to find a duty of affirmative action; noting this process of extension,
Prosser suggests that it will likely extend even further.'
Generally, the duty to act has been imposed where the relation is of some
actual or potential economic advantage to the defendant, and the expected
benefit justifies the requirement of special obligations." In this connection,
7.

PROSSER, supra note 3, at 348.
8. Id. at 338.
9. Id. at 339.
10. Id.
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a carrier has been required to aid a passenger in peril," an innkeeper his
guest, 2 a ship its seamen, 3 an employer his employee, 4 a shopkeeper his
business invitee, a jailer his prisoner, 6 and a school its pupil. 7
Where one has a duty to protect another, his responsibility may require
the reasonable control of a third party. Thus, the duty of a carrier to its
passengers may require it to prevent personal attacks" or thefts 9 on the
part of the other passengers or strangers. Analogous obligations would arise
in all of the other instances mentioned above. 0
Even in the absence of such a special relation toward the person injured,
the defendant may stand in such a relation to the third party himself as
to give him a definite control over his actions, carrying with it a duty to
exercise that control to protect another. In either case, the critical determinant of liability is social policy. If the actor has brought himself into a
human relationship with another, such that sound social policy requires
either some action or precaution to avoid harm, the duty to act or take the
precaution is imposed by law.
Although this duty has been held imposed in connection with certain
non-economic relationships, such as automobile owner and driver 23 and
parent and child, 24 it is most frequently found where the person to be
11. Yu v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 145 Conn. 451, 144 A.2d 56 (1958).
12. Dove v. Lowden, 47 F. Supp. 546 (W.D. Mo. 1942).
13. Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co. v. Hutchinson, 242 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1957).
14. At least in the course of his employment. Anderson v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 333
U.S. 821 (1948).
15. L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86, 40 N.E.2d 334 (1942).
16. Farmer v. State, 224 Miss. 96, 79 So. 2d 528 (1955).
17. Pirkle v. Oakdale Union Grammar School Dist., 40 Cal. 2d 207, 253 P.2d 1 (1953).
18. Kinsey v. Hudson & Manhattan R.R., 130 N.J.L. 285, 32 A. 2d 497 (1943), aff'd, 131
N.J.L. 161, 35 A.2d 888 (1944).
19. Pullman Palace-Car Co. v. Adams, 120 Ala. 581, 24 So. 921 (1898).
20. See, e.g., Knott Corp. v. Furman, 163 F.2d 199 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 809
(1947) (innkeeper-guests); Cashen v. Riney, 239 Ky. 779, 40 S.W.2d 339 (1931) (schoolpupils); Peck v. Gerber, 154 Ore. 126, 59 P.2d 675 (1936) (restaurant - customers).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §315 (1965) suggests the general rule as follows:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him
from causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the
other a right to protection.
22. Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886 (1934).
23. Wheeler v. Darmochwat, 280 Mass. 553, 183 N.E. 55 (1932). While an automobile may
not create a risk of abnormal danger sufficient to justify the imposition of strict liability, there
is no question that careless driving is "dangerous and fatal to thousands", thus justifying
control responsibilities without regard to the issue of economic benefit. PROSSER, supra note
3, at 507.
24. Harvey v. Shaver, 444 S.W. 2d 256 (Ark. 1969). To a large extent, such a duty is the
project of society's desire to reflect in the law a concept of family control, particularly in the
case of children lacking independent financial responsibility. See PRossE, supra note 3, at
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controlled has bestowed economic benefit on the responsible party. Accordingly, an employer must prevent his employees from throwing objects
from his factory windows" and the physician in charge of an operation may
be liable for his failure to prevent the negligence of his assistants." Basically, it would thus appear that one must protect against harm caused by
the same persons he must also protect."
In all cases in which nonfeasance is actionable, the duty imposed on
defendant is not an absolute one of insuring safety, but rather requires only
reasonable care,8 and there is no liability where such care has been used,"
or where the defendant neither knows nor has any reason to know that it
is called for.3 1 We are not concerned here with the doctrine of vicarious
liability which holds the defendant liable even though he may have done
his best to avoid harm on a particular occasion."
With respect to our hypothetical situation involving Company A and
Bank B, it is interesting to note that the Restatement does not cite the
32
creditor-debtor relationship as one triggering any control responsibilities.
Nevertheless, certain recent cases dealing with the area of product liability
suggest that creditor nonfeasance may have serious legal consequences.
Thus, it is now generally settled that a finance company that has purchased commercial paper from a dealer selling products to a consumer will
not necessarily be entitled to collect from the consumer as a holder in due
course free from any defenses which the consumer might claim against the
872. Clearly, this aspect of controlling-persons law is outside the scope of the present discussion.
25. Hogle v. H. H. Franklin Mfg. Co., 199 N.Y. 388, 92 N.E. 794 (1910); see also Connolly
v. Nicollet Hotel, 254 Minn. 373, 95 N.W.2d 657 (1959).
26. Davis v. Potter, 51 Idaho 81, 2 P.2d 318 (1931).
27. An interesting illustration of this principle can be found in Carey v. New Yorker of
Worcester, Inc., 355 Mass. 450, 245 N.E. 2d 420 (1969), where the court held that the operator
of a restaurant owed a duty of reasonable care to protect one patron from being shot by
another.
28. City of Dallas v. Jackson, 450 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. 1970).
29. Holly v. Meyers Hotel & Tavern, Inc., 9 N.J. 493, 89 A.2d 6 (1952).
30. Gold v. Heath, 392 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. 1965). See also PROSSER, supra note 3, at 343,
350, for a general discussion of the applicable standard of care in cases of this kind.
31. See PROSSER, supra note 3, at 458-459. Vicarious liability arises generally when losses
have been caused by employees' torts, which, as a practical matter, are certain to occur in
the conduct of the employer's enterprise and are therefore charged against that enterprise
itself as a cost of doing business. The employer, in turn, is able to absorb such losses and to
distribute them through higher prices to society at large, much like any other operating
expenditures.
32. The relations between the actor and a third person which require the actor to control
the third person's conduct are stated in §§316-19. The relations between the actor and the
other which require the actor to control the conduct of third persons for the protection of the
other are stated in §§314A and 320. The categories are generally those mentioned above, and
include innkeeper-guest, employer-employee and landowner-licensee. Since §315 itself speaks
in terms of "physical" harm, it is not surprising that the creditor-debtor relationship is not
mentioned. [All section references are to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS.]
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dealer if the product proves defective or non-existent." The courts are
likely to find that the dealer was the "agent""4 of the finance company or
that the finance company, rather than being an innocent third party, was
instead the "moving force" 5 having both the facilities and the bargaining
power to oversee the dealer's business and prevent credit sales of defective
merchandise by insolvent or undercapitalized dealers." In this situation,
control obligations have been imposed in order to vitiate a defense otherwise available to the maker of a note. A recent California case, Connor v.
Great Western Savings & Loan Ass'n,37 advances one degree further and
constructs an affirmative cause of action against a savings and loan association which financed the builder of improperly constructed houses. The
facts of the case are complex but deserve close analysis.
A newly-formed real estate developer sought funding from Great Western, a savings and loan association, in order to acquire certain land and
undertake construction thereon. After some preliminary negotiation, Great
33. See MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 106, §3-305, (1976) for a statutory statement of the general
rule protecting holders in due course of negotiable instruments. For an exhaustive collection
of common law authorities, see Britton, Fraudin the Inception of Bills and Notes, 9 CORNELL
L.Q. 138 (1924).
34. Titone v. General Elec. Cred. Corp., 201 Misc. 1041, 108 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
35. Commercial Cred. Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d
819 (1950).
36. This result has been reached legislatively as well. A Massachusetts statute requires
that if any contract for sale of consumer goods on credit between a retail seller and a retail
buyer requires or involves the execution of a promissory note, such note must have printed
on its face the words "consumer note," and a note so designated is not a negotiable instrument
within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code entitling a finance company to take it
free of defenses that the consumer has against the seller of the goods. MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch.
255, §12c (1968). To avoid the effects of this rule, finance companies might be tempted to
make direct loans to the consumer and have the consumer in turn pay the retail seller with
the proceeds of the loan. However, to close this potential "loophole," the Massachusetts
Legislature enacted MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 255, §12F (Supp. 1976), which is relevant to analysis
developed later in this note, and provides as follows:
A creditor in consumer loan transactions shall be subject to all of the defenses of
the borrower arising from the consumer sale or lease for which the proceeds of the
loan are used, if the creditor knowingly participated in or was directly connected
with a consumer sale or lease transaction ....
[A] creditor shall be deemed to have
knowingly participated in or to have been directly connected with a consumer sale
or lease transaction if: (a) he was a person related to the seller or lessor; (b) the
seller or lessor prepared documents used in connection with the loan; (c) the creditor supplied forms to the seller or lessor which were used by the consumer in
obtaining the loan; (d) the creditor was specifically recommended by the seller or
lessor to the borrower and made two or more loans in any calendar year, the proceeds of which are used in transactions with the same seller or lessor, or with a
person related to the same seller or lessor; or (e) the creditor was the issuer of a
credit card which may be used by the consumer in the sale or lease transaction as
a result of a prior agreement between the issuer and the seller or lessor.
37. 69 Cal. 2d 850, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 609 (1968). The judgment was a reversal
of plaintiffs' involuntary nonsuit.
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Western took title to the land, granting the developer an option to repurchase the land for a price which accounted for a capital gain to Great
Western when the option was ultimately exercised. 8 Although it was aware
of the developer's marginal financial resources and general inexperience,
Great Western agreed to provide construction financing on terms highly
favorable to itself, relying on improper financial information supplied by
the developer and foregoing its usual procedure of reviewing and approving
building plans. 9
Great Western exacted a right of first refusal from the developer with
respect to individual lot purchases. If an approved buyer wished to obtain
financing elsewhere, Great Western had ten days to meet the terms of the
proposed financing; if it met the terms and the loan was not placed with
Great Western, the developer was required to pay Great Western the fees
and interest obtained by the other lender in connection with the loan.' 0
When Great Western did provide mortgage financing, it charged the developer a 1% fee for loans made to qualified buyers who, in Great Western's
opinion, were poor risks. Great Western declined, however, to provide construction financing until a minimum number of houses were "pre-sold"
(sold before they were constructed) and then released funds periodically
after inspecting progress to insure that no money was paid over in advance
of construction satisfactory to it."
Shortly after the buyers moved in, the foundation began to crack because of improper construction, requiring costly repairs and diminishing
market value.' 2 Since the developer's resources were minimal, the aggrieved purchasers turned their attention to Great Western.
Although all members of the court agreed that no joint venture had been
formed,' 3 the majority, in a decision written by Justice Traynor, found that
Great Western had voluntarily undertaken business relationships with the
developer to create not only the physical project itself but also a market
in which prospective buyers would be directed to Great Western for financing. As a result of such activity, the court concluded, Great Western had
become much more than a lender content to lend money at interest on the
security of real property. Rather, it was an active participant in a home
38. 73 Cal. Rptr. at 376, 447 P. 2d at 616.
39. 73 Cal. Rptr. at 373, 447 P. 2d at 613.
40. 73 Cal. Rptr. at 374, 447 P. 2d at 614.
41. 73 Cal. Rptr. at 375, 447 P. 2d at 615.
42. 73 Cal. Rptr. at 371, 447 P. 2d at 611.
43. Generally, each partner in a joint venture is automatically liable for the debts and
misconduct of every other partner. Bachand v. Vidal, 328 Mass. 97, 101 N.E.2d 884 (1951).
Great Western participated as a buyer and seller of land and lender of funds, and the developer participated as a builder and seller of homes. Although the profits of each were dependent on the overall success of the development, neither was to share in the profits or the losses
that the other might realize or suffer. See Note, The Expanding Scope of EnterpriseLiability,
69 COLUM. L. REv. 1084 (1969).
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construction enterprise, having the right to exercise extensive control."
Justice Traynor then asserted that Great Western was under a duty of
care to its shareholders to exercise it powers of control over the enterprise
to prevent the construction of defective homes, and that it had negligently
failed to discharge that duty.45 Because Great Western knew of the developer's financial and technical shortcomings, "it therefore knew or should
have known that damage from attempts to cut corners in construction was
a risk reasonably to be foreseen."4 However, since the litigation was not a
derivative suit brought by Great Western's own shareholders, the crucial
question became whether Great Western also owed a duty to the homebuyers in the tract and was therefore negligent toward them as well. 7 The
fact that Great Western was not in privity of contract with any of the
plaintiffs, except as a lender in isolated individual transactions, was held
not to absolve it of liability for its own negligence in creating an unreasonable risk of harm to them. The duty imposed on Great Western to exercise
reasonable care in protecting the plaintiffs from the developer was predicated on factors that had been set forth in an earlier case."9 Essentially,
Justice Traynor concluded that Great Western's transactions were intended to have a significant effect on the plaintiffs, that Great Western
could reasonably have foreseen the risk of harm and that the injury suffered by plaintiffs was closely connected with Great Western's conduct."
In addition, Justice Traynor detected "substantial moral blame" in Great
Western's failure to protect buyers who were "ill-equipped with experience
or financial means to discern such structural defects." The court finally
relied on the "admonitory policy of the law of torts" stating that if existing
sanctions are inadequate, imposition of a duty at the point of effective
44. 73 Cal. Rptr. at 376, 447 P.2d at 616.
45. Id.
46. Id., citing Lefcoe & Dobson, Savings Associations as Land Developers, 75 YALE L.J.
1271, 1293 (1966). This article was significant in that it blames small, under-capitalized
builders for the sterotyped American housing development - "unsightly, unimaginative and
inefficient" - and suggested that the small developer's "lifeline" was the savings and loan
associations, which provide funds for real estate projects that are too risky to raise even an
investigation from most banks. Savings associations, in the article's view, survive by paying
a higher rate of interest than banks, and need the extra margin that small buiilders are willing
to pay to finance their speculative ventures. Thus, Lefcoe and Dobson implied that the lender
was an indispensable accomplice to housing defects and should be forced to supervise a
project and insist upon good construction before financing.
47. 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377, 447 P.2d at 617.
48. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958). There the court said: "The a
specific case the defendant will be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of
policy and involves the balancing of various factors, among which are [1] the extent to which
the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, [21 the foreseeability of harm to him,
131 the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, [4] the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, [51 the moral blame attached
to the defendant's conduct and [6] the policy of preventing future harm." 49 Cal. 2d at 650,
320 P.2d at 19.
49. 73 Cal. Rptr. at 379, 447 P.2d at 619.
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financial control of tract building will insure responsible building practices."
Justice Mosk dissented from the majority opinion, which he considered
counterproductive and likely to increase housing costs and prices at a time
of great demand.' The issue of right of control, in his view, was especially
crucial where the alleged negligent conduct was asserted to be a failure to
control the conduct of an independent third party.
Justice Mosk could find no authority holding "that lender-borrower is
the type of relationship contemplating the duty of control over the conduct
of another so as to present injury to third parties."5 He viewed the evidence as being barren of any indication that Great Western maintained
any element of control over the enterprise or had any right to direct the
developer's activities. In short, Great Western appeared to Justice Mosk
to have exercised no greater "control" over the building project than any
other lender who can withhold
funds if he believes the funds will be used
53
in a harmful manner.
Despite this broad construction of the majority opinion, it appears that
Justice Traynor was in fact faithful to the rather limited test suggested by
Dean Prosser and the case law. The duty to control was imposed on Great
Western not simply because it had assumed creditor status, but rather
because its relationship to both the developer and the purchasers was "of
some actual or potential economic advantage" extending beyond the desire
to insure the payment of principal and interest, and because the expected
benefit was such as "justifies the requirement of special obligations. 5
Consistent with this narrow focus, subsequent judicial decisions in California and elsewhere have indicated a propensity to limit the Connor holding to situations in which the creditor has become an active participant in
the profits realized by a project which it has financed. 5 Later cases have
stressed that the land financing arrangement in Connor featured entepreneurial profits in the nature of capital gains as well as an opportunity,
guaranteed by the developer, to make permanent loans to every purchaser.
50. 73 Cal. Rptr. at 378, 447 P.2d at 618. The scope of tort law policy is probably best
expressed by Prosser, who asserts, "No better general statement can be made, than that the
courts will find a duty where, in general, reasonable men would recognize it and agree that it
exists." PROSSER, supra note 3, at 327. Cf. Prosser, PalsgrafRevisited, 52 MICH. L. Rxv. 1
(1953).
51. 73 Cal. Rptr. at 385, 447 P.2d at 625.
52. 73 Cal. Rptr. at 382, 447 P.2d at 622.
53. 73 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83, 447 P.2d at 622-23.
54. See text accompanying notes 7-27 supra.
55. Prosser, supra note 3, at 339.
56. See, e.g., Skerlec v. Wells Fargo Bank, 18 Cal. App. 3d 1003, 96 Cal. Rptr. 434 (1971);
Weiss v. Brentwood Say. & Loan Ass'n, 4 Cal. App. 3d 738, 84 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969); Flamingo
Drift Fishing, Inc. v. Nix 251 So. 2d 316 (Fla. App. 1971); Callaizakis v. Astor Development
Co., 41111. App. 3d 163, 280 N.E.2d 512 (1972). Cf. Blackwell v. Midland Federal Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 132 Colo. 45, 284 P.2d 1060 (1955).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

Similarly, a California codification of the Connor case exculpates lenders
from liability for their borrowers' misconduct in instances where the lender
has engaged only in its usual finance activities. 7 Thus, the fate of Great
Western remains illustrative of the conditions under which the courts and
the legislature are willing to undermine the individualistic philosophy of
the common law and to impose affirmative control obligations. 8 The extent to which Congress was similarly included when it enacted the federal
securities law is the far from settled question to which we now must turn.
II.
A.

STATUTORY PRINCIPLES

General Standards

Neither the Securities Act nor the Securities Exchange Act defines
"control." The legislative history, however, indicates that Congress intended the term to have broad applicability. The House Committee report,
referring to the definition of "indemnities" in the Securities Act, asserted
that the concept of control which it had intended to incorporate was not a
narrow one, depending upon a mathematical formula of 51% of voting
power, but rather had been broadly defined to permit the provisions of the
act to become effective wherever the fact of control actually exists. 9
With respect to the concept of control as used in the registration and
civil liability provisions of the Securities Exchange Act,60 the same com57. Calif. Civ. Code §3434 (West 1970) provides in pertinent part: "A lender who makes
a loan of money, the proceeds of which are used or may be used by the borrower to finance
the ...construction ... of real or personal property for sale to others, shall not be held liable
to third persons for any loss or damage occasioned by any defect in the real or personal
property to . . . constructed . . . or for any loss or damage resulting from the failure of the
borrower to use due care in the ... construction ... of such real or personal property, unless
such loss or damage is as a result of an act of the lender outside the scope of the activities of
a lender of money or unless the lender has been a party to misrepresentationswith respect to
such real or personal property. " (Emphasis supplied).
58. In this connection, it is interesting to note that the laws of Soviet Russia and other
countries in which the regulation of the individual is prevalent recognize a duty to rescue
another in peril, regardlss of the existing relationship between the parties. Note, Failure to
Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 631 (1952).
59. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1933).
60. Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. §78t(a) provides as
follows:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly
and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person
to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good
faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the
violation or cause of action.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is different from the Securities Act of 1933, discussed
at note 5, supra. The Securities Act is a highly integrated statute focusing on a single objective, namely the disclosure of information through the registration of securities which are
being offered to the public. The Securities Exchange Act was enacted one year later to
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mittee stated that the term "control" was intended to include actual control as well as so-called "legally enforceable control."6 The committee was
unwilling to define the term further, feeling that it would be difficult if not
impossible to enumerate or to anticipate the many ways in which actual
control may be exerted. Citing stock ownership, lease, contract and agency
as examples of the methods used, the committee added that actual control
sometimes may be exerted through ownership of much less than a majority
of the stock of a corporation either by the ownership of such stock alone or
2
through such ownership in combination with other factors.
The Commission has supplemented the statutory language with its own
definition, which expressly acknowledges the possibility of indirect control
of management and policies as follows:
The term "control" (including the terms "controlling," "controlled by"
and "under common control with") means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and
policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities,
by contract, or otherwise.63
Despite the absence of statutory definition, it has been held that the
concept of "control" is not unconstitutionally vague for criminal purposes.
In United States v. Re," the Second Circuit concluded that "[tihe meaning of 'control' under the [Securities] act is no different than it is in
normal everyday usage."
It does seem fairly clear, in this connection, that Congress intended to
establish a "controlling person" liability distinct from typical common-law
principles of agency and respondeat superior. Construing §15 of the Securities Act, a federal district court has indicated that the section, and particularly its "unless" provision, has no applicability to the liability of a brokerage house for acts or omissions of its employees. 6 The court was persuaded
that a contrary conclusion would in effect give blessing to a "hear-no-evil,
see-no-evil" approach by masters toward servants which is "hardly in
keeping with the remedial purposes" of the Act.67 Rather, an employer
regulate the securities markets and the activities of broker-dealers so it therefore covers a wide
range of controls and subject matter. See CARY, supra note 5, at 297-298.
61. Citing Handy & Harmon v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 136 (1931).
62. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 147 (1934).
63. 17 C.F.R. §230.405(f) (1976).
64. 336 F.2d 306 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964).
65. Id. at 316.
66. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1968).
67. Id. at 1212. A similar approach was taken in Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453
(E.D.N.Y. 1968), where the court ruled that to establish liability under the controlling person
provision of the Securities Exchange Act, it is not necessary to establish the common-law
relation of principal and agent, and brokers must exercise careful and diligent supervision of
office employees exposed to the public and must maintain and enforce a proper system of
internal control.
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would continue to be strictly liable for acts of its employees within the
scope of their authority as if such acts had been performed by the employer
himself under §11,' and §15 would apparently be reserved for the more
esoteric type of control relationship exemplified by the Connor case.
Both §15 and its counterpart in the Securities Exchange Act 6 have
repeatedly been interpreted so as to satisfy the principal congressional
purpose of protecting investors in a highly sophisticated field.70 Courts
have recognized a duty to be alert and to provide such remedies as the
effectuation of this purpose may require. 7' Nevertheless, their concern has
not led them to eschew careful factual analysis. Instead, the issue of
"control" has been treated as a complex question which requires an examination of the relationships of the various alleged "controlling persons" to
the person or entity which transacted the sale of securities alleged to have
violated the relevant act. 71 Such an examination, moreover, cannot be
limited to a cursory review of the proportionate equity positions, employment or director
status of such persons as of the dates of the alleged
73
violations .
Occasionally, there have been indications that control may be presumed
from the mere existence of certain relationships. Thus, in Moerman v.
Zipco, Inc., 71 a federal district court in New York felt the conclusion to be
inescapable that persons who act as directors are in control of their
corporations, especially in light of the liberal construction generally given
75
to §15 of the Securities Act.
However, this notion of per se liability was rejected in Strong v. France,71
in which the Ninth Circuit stressed that the persons held liable in
77
Moerman had 'insisted on being members of the board' of directors". If
the status of director is not an automatic trigger of liability, then, almost
a fortiori, neither is that of creditor. Although the issue is yet to be conclusively determined, decisions in other regulatory contexts, to be considered
below, strongly suggest that the common-law approach of Judge Traynor
in Connor, stressing factual nuances and refusing to impose general sanc68. To this extent, §11 incorporates the standards of vicarious liability discussed at note
31, supra.
69. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t(a) (1971). See note 60, supra.
70. See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968); Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968).
71. See Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
72. Klapmeier v. Telecheck Int'l, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Minn. 1970).
73. Id.
74. 302 F. Supp. 439 (E.D. N.Y. 1969).
75. Id. at 447. See also note 70, supra.
76. 474 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1973).
77. Id. at 751. Louis Loss has commented that although a person's being an officer or
director does not create any presumption of control, it is a "sort of red light" which automatically generates the need for further careful inquiry. L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 781 (2d
ed. 1961).
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tions on all creditors as a matter of law, will be followed. Accordingly, any
analysis of the case law must be undertaken in conjunction with an analysis of the types of circumstances which could conceivabley expose the
creditor to liability.
B.

Types of Creditor "Control"

In his book, The Curtis-Culligan Story,"8 Matthew J. "Joe" Culligan
relates his meteoric rise and fall as chief executive officer of the ailing
Curtis Publishing Company. Culligan refers extensively to the role that
creditor banks played in helping Curtis through its difficulties. Of particular interest is a paragraph in one of Culligan's after-the-fact memoranda,
which says: "With the signing of the $38 million bank loan in December
1963, every decision of any consequence had to be approved in advance by
the banks via The First National Bank of Boston, the agent bank. This rule
'7
was never violated. 9
Assuming Culligan's description of the relationship was accurate, one is
almost compelled to conclude that, under any definition of the term, a
"control" relationship existed between the Bank and Curtis. The power to
review "every decision of any consequence" in advance is by definition a
control relationship for the purposes of any statute which uses the word in
accordance with its most common English usage.
Presumably, however, the Curtis situation is uncommon. The First National Bank's relationship was accentuated by the financial difficulty of
the debtor, and Curtis was in close proximity to the stage of courtsupervised reorganization in which the creditors would be de jure as well
as de facto in control of its affairs."0 In the more typical situation, creditors
supply capital and receive in return a contractual right to recovery of such
capital and an additional sum for its use. Unlike the common stockholder
who enjoys a voting interest and whose shares fluctuate in value with the
profitability of business operations, the creditor has no ownership interest.
As long as the corporation is able to avoid insolvency, he will have no
concern with the failure or success of managment in generating profits and
78. M.

CULLIGAN, THE CURTIS-CULLIGAN STORY (1970).
79. Id. at 208.
80. Ultimate liquidation of the corporation obviously eliminates the control question.
Reorganization as an alternative may well result in the creditors becoming the shareholders
and thereby obtaining the control position which corresponds to that status. See MeteorMetropolitan Aircraft Sale & Leaseback, 26 C.A.B. 596 (1958), in which the CAB hearing
examiner concluded that the lessor (an aviation consultant) in a sale and leaseback of the
major portion of a small carrier's fleet of airplanes at a time when the carrier was in serious
financial difficulty acquired potential control, making the transaction subject to C.A.B.
jurisdiction. The Board affirmed the examiner's approval of the transaction, but found that
the control question had been rendered moot by the carrier's bankruptcy. See also Chemical
Bank N.Y. Trust Co. v. S.S. Westhampton, 231 F. Supp. 84 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd, 358 F.2d
574 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 921 (1966).
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expanding operations. " Likewise, the corporation worries more about its
general ability to obtain capital than it does about the influence of any one
individual creditor.82 Thus, when the Second Circuit was called upon to
determine whether the holder of ten per cent of a convertible debenture
issue was an insider under § 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, it concluded
that in normal circumstanes no person would, solely by reason of holding
convertible debentures, have any standing or position with the officers,
directors, or large stockholders of a company entitling him to receive any
inside information.83 The court could find no provision in the debentures
which gave their holder any standing beyond that of a creditor entitled to
certain specific payments of interest at stated intervals, and possessing
numerous rights all of which are specifically spelled out in the trust indenture pursuant to which the debentures were issued."4
Problems arise in the context of control obligations when the creditor
either wishes some additional protection against deterioration of the
debtor or, as in the context of a real estate market characterized by a
restricted supply of credit, is anxious to exploit an advantegeous bargaining position. An innumerable array of special provisions and restrictive
covenants, including those referred to in the hypothetical situation, may
be used to obtain the additional protection."
The general function of the restrictive covenants is to maintain or improve the ratio between debt and assets that exist at the time financing is
extended. A common restriction, therefore, simply prohibits the incurrence
of any debt that would result in exceeding a specified debt-asset ratio.
Other clauses prohibiting dividends, certain forms of investment and the
sale of a significant proportion of corporate property are useful in protecting assets. 6
Such restrictions on management, according to one commentary, are
"referable entirely to the customary protections of financial position" and
"are no more a restraint on management than significant contracts with
'
non-creditors."87
Thus, a company's activities may well be severely restricted by its relationship to a labor union and by the provisions of a union
contract, but it is almost inconceivable that the union would be held
81. Enstam & Kamen, Control and the Institutional Investor, 23 Bus. LAW. 289, 319
(1968).
82. J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 80 (1967).
83. Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107, (2d Cir. 1967).
84. Id. at 111.
85. The content of typical covenants in a loan agreement is generally discussed in Simpson, The Drafting of Loan Agreements: A Borrower's Viewpoint, 28 Bus. LAW. 1161 (1973).
The author discusses, among other things, the extent to which lenders are interested in
obtaining or exercising control over a borrower's business through the insertion of appropriate
provisions in the agreement.
86. Id.
87. Enstam & Kamen, supra note 81, at 321.
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responsible for the company's misconduct."s
9
In one leading case on this subject,1
which is interesting because of its
review of judicial precedent (or the lack thereof), an aircraft manufacturer,
Canadair, attempted to obtain injunctive enforcement of restrictive covenants in mortgages it held on the aircraft it had sold to an air carrier,
Seaboard. Canadair particularly sought to enforce a restriction limiting
capital investments and rent obligations, 0 in order to enjoin a leasepurchase agreement that Seaboard had entered into with Douglas, another
aircraft manufacturer. The issue before the court was whether such restrictions were invalid in that they gave control over the carrier to the manufacturer without prior administrative approval as required under §408 of the
Civil Aeronautics Act."
Canadair argued that these agreements merely provided for the ordinary
debtor-creditor relationship, with the usual protective terms found in such
agreements, and that "control" should be construed to mean the direction
and running of a business rather than the situation in which the ordinary
creditor status is protected with the usual remedies available to the creditors. 2 On the other hand, Douglas relied upon some expressions by examiners of the CAB indicating that3 they believed that a creditor-debtor relationship could involve control .
The court, finding that no clear-cut and authorative citation for Douglas' contention had been presented, and that no case had been cited covering a situation of control exercised by such a financing agreement, concluded that administrative approval would not be necessary."
In another case, In re Clearfield Bituminous Coal Corp.,'" the Securities
and Exchange Commission specifically found that the contractual right to
veto the creation of liens on extraordinary debt did not create control. 6
Clearfield, the sole owner of several public utility companies, had leased
certain properties to another company and given its proxies to the lessee,
whom it authorized to vote the stock of the utility companies and to exercise other rights of ownership such as receiving dividends. The lessee was,
88. Arguably, the analogy may be inexact, given the protection which labor unions receive
from the radiations of the vast body of protective legislation enacted on their behalf. On the
other hand, since capital, like labor, has traditionally been considered a factor of production
which is distinct from entrepreneurial activity, it should be similarly insulated from the
liabilities arising from such activity.
89. Canadair v. Seaboard World Airlines, 43 Misc.2d 320, 250 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Sup. Ct.
1964).
90. 43 Misc.2d at 322, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
91. 49 U.S.C.A. §1378 (1976).
92. 43 Misc.2d at 324, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 727.
93. Id.
94. Id. Nevertheless, the desired injunctive relief was not granted because Canadair was
found to have delayed unreasonably in bringing suit.
95. 1 S.E.C. 374 (1936).
96. Id. at 375.
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however, prohibited from creating liens on the property, incurring extraordinary indebtedness, increasing the capital stock or committing any ultra
vires acts. Clearfield brought an action under §2(a)(7) of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act, which allows a company to apply for an order
declaring that it is not a holding company. 7 The SEC held that there
would be no control or controlling influence by Clearfield as long as the
present arrangement continued, and it issued an order to that effect.1s
Based on cases such as these, Louis Loss has concluded: "Presumably,
therefore, the standard restrictive covenants in corporate indentures do not
per se constitute control." 99 However, a different question, as yet unresolved by the case law, arises when the creditor insists, as in the hypothetical situation, upon special restrictions regarding the composition of the
company's management personnel. The creditor might wish to insure
against violations of any restrictive covenants contained in the loan agreement by excluding those who might be tempted to commit them.'" In that
sense, management control is a logical extension of the provisions condoned in Canadairand Clearfield. Nevertheless, some have suggested that
the reasoning underlying those decisions is unsound.
Among the critics were the draftsmen of the Wheat Report. °0 Proposed
Rule 160, while not providing a positive definition of control, did undertake
to declare what control was not. Thus, had the Rule been adopted (it was
not circulated for comment), a person would not be a "controlling person"
if he:
97. Public Utility Holding Company Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 79b(a)(7) (1971).
98. 1 S.E.C. at 376. Unfortunately, the case is quite brief and the conclusion of the
Commission is little more than a rephrasing of the statutory language.
99. L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 779 n. 33 (Supp. 1969).
100. Enstam & Kamen, supra note 81, at 322. Were the question to involve a national
bank or a state bank belonging to the Federal Reserve System, the provisions of 12 U.S.C.A.
§221a (1945), which define the type of organization to be considered an "affiliate" of the bank,
would become relevant. That section provides:
(b) Except where otherwise specifically provided, the term "affiliate" shall include any corporation, business trust, association, or other similar organization (1) of which a member bank, directly or indirectly ...controls.., in any manner
the election of a majority of its directors, trustees, or other persons exercising
similar functions ....
It would be uncommon for a creditor to be invested with such power, either by the express
terms of the loan agreement or through an implicit position of authority. In any event, the
fact that Congress selected the named characteristics as establishing the relationship of
"affiliate" would not appear particularly persuasive in the present context regarding the
proper definition of control.
101. SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES
UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACT - THE WHEAT REPORT (CCH ed. 1969). This report was the product
of a comprehensive study undertaken by a small group of members of the Commission's staff
under the direction of Commissioner Francis M. Wheat. A number of changes in existing
securities law were discussed in the report, and one of the objects of the draftsmen was to
provide standards in the uncertain area of determining control. Sowards, The Wheat Report
and Reform of Federal Securities Regulation, 23 VAND. L. REV. 495, 516 (1970).
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(1) is neither an executive officer nor a director of [the] corporation, (2)
does not perform the functions of an executive officer or director of [the]
corporation, (3) is not a person owning beneficially, or possessing voting
rights respecting securities representing more that 10% of the voting power
of such corporation, (4) is neither father, mother, child, brother, sister or
unseparated spouse of any individual referred to in (1), (2) or (3) above,
(5) is not a creditor of such corporation whose consent is presently required, or may be requiredunder circumstanceswithin his control, before
changes in the management of0 the corporation, or other corporate
transactions. . . may take place. 2
Although this rule has been criticized for its willingness not to find
1
control, 03
a far more justified complaint relates to the harshness of its
standards. The fears expressed in Justice Mosk's dissenting opinion in
Connor seem particularly appropriate in this connection. Proposed Rule
160 suggested the use of a mythical concept of control, consisting essentially of the power to refuse to lend money unless there are firm contractual
assurances that its repayment will not be endangered by the debtor's
reckless business practices. To repeat Justice Mosk's language, "in this
respect, all lenders may be held to 'control' the projects they finance. "''
C.

Standardsfor Liability

It is difficult to find a point between protective restrictions and total
creditor supervision at which control responsibilities should be imposed.
A reasonable and defensible conclusion would be that, once the creditor is
not satisfied with simply insulating himself from the risk of loss of capital
and interest, and instead insists upon affirmative participation in the entepreneurial effort being financed, he has, in Prosser's terms, entered into a
relationship whose expected extraordinary economic benefit justifies the
requirement of special obligations.' 0
Moreover, the fact that the creditor has been able to obtain affirmative
participation is perhaps the truest evidence of his control over the
financially-beleaguered debtor. In this sense, the proper scope of the securities law should be virtually identical to that recently developed by the
common law. That is the result indicated by cases like Canadair,in which
the creditor was permitted to protect himself with "the usual remedies"
while his posture remained merely defensive in nature. 16 The reasoning of
102. THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 101, app. VI-I at 71 (emphasis supplied).
103. One experienced private attorney complained that the rule created "safe harbors"
by giving persons who in fact control a corporation the means to avoid the consequences of
control: "It is possible for a creditor to dominate a corporation even though his legal rights
under the debt instruments are not as broad as stated under the proposed rule. PNACTICnO
LAW INSTITUTE, CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS AND OTHER INSIDERS, 19 CORPORATE TRANScRIPT
SERIES 32 (1971).
104. 73 Cal. Rptr. at 383, 447 P.2d at 623.
105. See text accompanying notes 10, 23-27 supra.
106.

See text accompanying notes 8-94, supra.
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Justice Traynor's majority opinion in Connor suggests that Great Western's extensive control of the enterprise was intended to secure not only the
payment of debt service (which later case law appears to condone)," 7 but
also its own share in the enterprise:
Its financing, which made the enterprise possible, took on ramifications
beyond the domain of the usual money lender. It received not only interest
on its construction loans, but also substantial fees for making them, a 20
percent capital gain for "warehousing" the land, and protection from loss
of profit in the event individual home buyers sought permanent financing
elsewhere .'0

Many creditors are anxious to exploit the opportunities of a chaotic
money market. One real estate financier has bluntly asserted, "In today's
market we can make just about any deal we want to," leading a commentator to conclude that "today the fixed interest loan is dead."'' 9 An unlikely
parallel arises to the so-called "rescue" doctrine in tort law. The creditor
who cares only for repayment of the debt and not for the fortunes of his
debtor is like the expert swimmer, with a boat and a rope at hand, who
rents a boat to an intoxicated man, watches the man upset the boat and
fall into the water, and yet is not required to do anything at all about it
but may sit on the dock, smoke his cigarette, and watch the man drown.'"
On the other hand, a creditor, like Great Western, that has entered voluntarily into a relation which is attended with responsibility to both the
debtor and the debtor's stockholders will find himself, like the Good Samaritan who tries to save the swimmer, mulcted in damage if the job is
done poorly."' With affirmative conduct thus has come voluntary assump107. See note 56, supra.
108. 73 Cal. Rptr. at 376, 447 P.2d at 616 (emphasis supplied).
109. The Future Largest Landlords in America, 82 FORTUNE 90 (No. 1, July, 1970). The
article notes that during the 1950's and early 1960's, mortgage money was abundant, and the
converse situation occurred: The developer could obtain a commitment to lend the full cost
of the project, and even more. "In those days," confessed one interviewee, "we made more
105 percent loans, and more millionaire developers, than I care to confess."
110. Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301 (1928). While the rule expressed in the
Osterlind case remains the general rule, PROSSER, supra note 3, at 340-343, it is interesting to
note that the Massachusetts court recently overturned its earlier holding and declared that
"[in the context of the relationship between an owner or occupier (owner) of property and
a trapped, imperiled and helpless trespasser thereon, we reject any rule which would exempt
the owner from liability if he knowingly refrains from taking reasonable action which he is in
a position to take and which would prevent injury or further injury to the trespasser." Pridgen
v. Boston Housing Auth., Mass. Adv. Sheets 245, 258-259, 308 N.E.2d 467, 476 (1974). In
citing a concern for the personal safety and well-being of the plaintiff, Mass. Adv. Sheets at
260, 308 N.E.2d at 477, the court clearly suggested that the scope of its decision was to be
limited to cases involving physical danger, where the "voice of conscience" mentioned by
Prosser would seem to be loudest. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 341.
111. Abresch v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 246 Minn. 408, 75 N.W.2d 206 (1956) (a
telephone company undertook to call the fire department for the plaintiff).
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tion of duty, and the fact that the creditor's motives are not altruistic will
strengthen arguments for the imposition of liability."'
An illustration of these principles is offered by the case of In re Walston
& Co.,"' involving a brokerage limited partnership. The SEC brought an
action for violation of §15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act," 4 claiming
that certain loans to the partnership were in reality capital contributions
by a "lender" not mentioned in the application for registration, which was
therefore false and misleading.
The "lender" had set up a trust to lend money to the partnership. Each
of the partners borrowed their capital contribution from a limited partner
who received this money from the trustees. The conditions for these loans
had the effect of giving the "lender:" (1) The right to acquire the borrowers' partnership interests at any time by cancelling the balance of the loan;
(2) The right to the borrowers' share of profits and losses; and (3) The right
to the interest on the loans by the trust to the limited partner/intermediary.
The "lender" was found to be in control, since as a result of his various
loans he was the contributor of more than 92% of the firm's stated capital
and of large sums of additional working capital and received 90% of all
profits while being responsible for losses in a similar proportion. Moreover,
he would acquire legal title to any portion of the firm which he did not own
by the exercise of various options and could force out of the partnership
any or all of the partners at his pleasure."6
It is always possible that the potential for control arising from market
conditions will not be realized. Where supplies of a commodity are scarce,
the supplier may prefer to obtain higher prices rather than control over the
112. Many states have adopted legislation protecting the Good Samaritan from liability
for his negligence in attempting to help others. While such laws are generally commended
for removing a significant deterrent to citizen involvement, they also have been criticized for
their application to doctors, who (like creditors) expect to receive income from the person in
peril. See Note, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1964).
113. 7 S.E.C. 937 (1940).
114. 15 U.S.C.A. §78o(b) (Supp. 1976). This section, which further implements the protective functions discussed at notes 5 and 60, supra, provides in relevant part as follows: "The
Commission by order, shall .. .revoke the registration of any broker or dealer if it finds...
that such .. .revocation is in the public interest and that [1] such broker or dealer whether
prior or subsequent to becoming such, or [2] any person associated with such broker or dealer
...(A) has willfully made or caused to be made in any application for registration .. any
statement which was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it was
made false or misleading with respect to any material fact; .. .or (D) has willfully violated
any provision of ... this chapter."
115. 7 S.E.C. at 943-945.
116. Id. at 948. In In re Sweet's Steel Co., 4 S.E.C. 589 (1939), a major creditor sharing
in profits and losses and maintaining an option to exchange his "loan" for equity in the firm
was found to be a controlling person. In this regard, Massachusetts consumer loan statutes,
supra note 36, appear to suggest that when the creditor has a stake in a dealer's business receiving interest from the ultimate consumer - he must be held accountable for the condition of any goods purchased.
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business of his customer. Once a pattern of control has emerged, however,
it may be difficult to reverse. The Civil Aeronautics Board confronted this
problem in the Toolco-Northeast Control Case."' Toolco, long the sole
source of financial support for Northeast Airlines, had deposited all of its
stock in Northeast in trust and promised to provide $3 million in continued
assistance. 18 Ruling that Toolco had not divested itself of control over
Northeast, the Board found that the trust did not in fact eliminate either
Northeast's financial dependence on Toolco or Toolco's resultant power to
dominate Northeast, because there was sufficient doubt of the legal enforceability of the promise to provide $3 million and because of the likelihood that Northeast's needs during the term of the trust would exceed $3
million." '
In connection with the Toolco case, however, it should be emphasized
that an examination of the indicia of control is not useful without a corresponding inquiry into the policy underlying the relevant statute.' 20 The
Civil Aeronautics Act, as noted in the earlier discussion of the Canadair
decision, 2 ' restricts the acquisition of control over any air carrier by any
other air carrier, by any person controlling another air carrier, by any other
common carrier, or by "any person engaged in any other phase of aeronautics."' 2 The word "aeronautics" is defined as "the science and art of
flight."'" Such language implies that Congress intended to facilitate broad
supervision of possible anti-competitive consolidations, and the meaning
24
of "control" in this context was widened accordingly in Toolco.'
Even within the relatively narrow compass of those statutes designed to
protect the investor, the meaning of control is not necessarily the same in
every context. Although the "New Deal" Congress was determined to undercut all corporate practices employed to deceive and discriminate
against the small investor,'2 5 and to the extent acted with a single purpose,
117. 42 C.A.B. 822 (1965). See also Transocean-Atlas Case, Control & Interlocking Relationships, 29 C.A.B. 622 (1959).
118. 42 C.A.B. at 827.
119. Id.
120. A good discussion of the general problem of judicial refusal to recognize legislative
policy can be found in Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws
Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 227 (1958).
121. See text accompanying notes 89-94, supra.
122. Civil Aeronautics Act, 49 U.S.C.A. §1378(a)(5) (1976).
123. 49 U.S.C.A. §1301(2) (1976).
124. As the Civil Aeronautics Board noted in another case, "control" as used in §408 does
not necessarily depend upon the ownership of any spcific minimum percentage of stock or
other ownership rights but rather depends, in the light of all the facts and circumstances in
a particular case, upon whether there exists as a matter of fact a power to dominate or an
actual domination of one legal personality by another. Boston & M. and Maine & C. Railroads
Control of Northeast Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 379, 381 (1943).
125. See note 5, supra. A concise statement of the conception that motivated Congress
can be found in a 1933 House Report, which concluded: "Alluring promises of easy wealth
were freely made with little or no attempt to bring to investors' attention those facts essential
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its approach was never intended to be doctrinaire.6 Thus, in the case of
the public utility industry, which had the largest number of investors in
the country and in which holding company abuses were most flagrant,'"
Congress insisted that gas and electric holding companies which exercised
a "controlling" influence over operating subsidiaries be brought under
regulatory supervision.12s The act was made broad enough to include any
company in a position to exploit its subsidiaries, including both the fully
integrated holding company and the company which existed only to invest
in its subsidiaries.12
Similarly, investment companies exercising control (defined as
"controlling influence") over their operating subsidiaries were made subject to regulation by the Investment Company Act of 1940.13 Here, however, Congress did not wish to interfere with integrated industrial empires
and granted a general exemption to those holding companies employed
primarily to operate subsidiaries over which they had a controlling influence. 3 ' Because Congress did not explicitly refer to the limited nature of
the intended exemption and instead used language which could be inferred
to apply to all loose control arrangements, the Commission applied the
exemption not only to integrated holding companies but also to companies
exercising a "controlling influence" short of actual directive power. 3 So
to an estimation of the worth of any security. Whatever may have been the full catalogue of
forces that brought to pass the present depression, not least among them has been this wanton
misdirection of the capital resources of the nation." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.,
2-3 (1933).
126. See Note, The Meaning of "Control" in the Protectionof Investors, 60 YALE L.J. 311,
336 (1951).
127. Id. at 312.
128. Public Utility Holding Company Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §79a (1971). Section 79a(8) offers
subsidiaries the same opportunity to exempt themselves as parents by providing that they
are not controlled or subject to a controlling influence by the holding company. If the SEC
cannot regulate an applicant as a holding company, it may be able to regulate it as an affiliate
under §79a(11) if it stands in such relation to a specified company "that there is liable to be
such an absence of arm's-length bargaining in transactions between them" as to justify
regulation in the public interest.
129. The SEC was quick to determine that "controlling influence" under the Holding
Company Act meant something less in the form of influence over the management or policies
of a company than "control" under the Securities Act. In re Byllesby & Co., 6 S.E.C. 639
(1940). To establish the lack of "controlling influence," parents were required to show that
their subsidiaries were not susceptible to their control. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. SEC, 127
F.2d 378, 382 (9th Cir. 1942). Susceptibility could even arise from "a long-established voluntary practice" of conferring or advising the utility on construction, production or financial
matters. In re Manchester Gas Co., 7 S.E.C. 57, 62 (1940).
130. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §80a-2(a)(9) (1971).
131.

15 U.S.C.A. §80a-3(b)(2) (1971). Hearings Before House Committee on HR 10065,

76th Cong., 3d Sess., 101-102 (1940).
132. Once the "susceptibility to control" test, used in the holding company context, had
been carried over to the investment company area, applicants for exemption seldom had
difficulty proving their "controlling influence" and thus escaping regulation. Such "mass
immunity" was hardly what Congress intended when it sought to protect companies having
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construed, the Investment Company Act "puts the shoe on the other foot
33
[as far as control is concerned].'
Another concern of Congress related to a familiar practice, issuers' and
underwriters' appointing and controlling bond indenture trustees who
could be expected to permit management domination of bankruptcy proceedings to the financial detriment of the bondholders.' The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 disqualified any trustee who "controls or is directly of
indirectly controlled by, or is under ... common control with" either the
issuer or the underwriter of the bond issue. 3 5 Given congressional intent
to establish strict fiduciary standards, use of the more inclusive term
"controlling influence" rather than "control" would have been more appropriate. In fact, when the SEC was called upon to interpret the word
"control," it looked to the purpose of the legislation and employed a broad
1
standard which was very much akin to "controlling influence . 3
Sound statutory construction, rejecting the notion that most words have
a fixed significance, and guided by a resolve to place legislative intent
above semantics, would thus reveal that, in the securities area, Congress
has generally displayed great flexibility in implementing its goal of investor protection.' There is no indication that creditors were to be viewed as
actual directive power over their subsidiaries. See 60 YALE L.J. at 333; Thomas, Investment
Company Act of 1940, 9 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 918, 925 (1941). Cf. the similar definition of
control in the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §802-2(a)(12) (1971).
133. Loss, supra note 77, at 769.
134. SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF WORK, Ac'rivms, PERSONNEL AND
FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES, (PT. VI 1937).
135. Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §77jjj (b)(3)-(1971).
136. In In re J.P. Morgan & Co., 10 S.E.C. 119 (1941), it was ruled that commercial banks
could not act as trustees for issues underwritten by their descendant underwriting firms. Here
control was fortified by business and personal friendships and the sharing of good will,
including the prestige of the Morgan name. The Commission's decision in closing a loophole
which would have permitted trustees to escape disqualification through the simple device of
distributing their holdings in the underwriter to other members of their families, is to be
contrasted with its record of performance under the Investment Company Act. Clearly, the
trustee is depended upon to act promptly and decisively in protection of bondholders, and
the Trust Indenture Act generally prohibits the indenture from containing any provisions
relieving the trustee from liability for its own negligent action. 15 U.S.C.A. §77ooo (1971).
The trustee's responsibility is thus similar to that which Great Western was found to have to
its own shareholders in the Connor case (see text accompanying note 45, supra) and is
irrelevant to the issue of responsibility to the shareholders of the issuer.
137. Congress has employed narrow quantitative formulas where it wanted control to be
determined mechanically. Thus, the insider reporting rules of §16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act are applicable to any investor holding more than 10% of any class of registered
equity security, and such investor is subject to liability for short-swing profits under §16(b).
15 U.S.C.A. §78p (1971). "While this provision does not relate to control per se, it is aimed
at persons who it is thought might be in a control position or be part of or privy to management decisions." Enstam & Kamen, supra note 81, at 292.
138. See, e.g., Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828
(1942), in which the court found that the manufacturer of food not only processed and dressed
it up to make it appear appetizing, but he also used newspapers, magazines, billboards, and
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presumptive targets of liability, and indeed cases like Canadair and
Clearfield establish that a creditor engaging in normal financing activities
will be absolved from liability even under statutory provisions intended to
have a broad impact on misconduct and abuse of power.
As a policy matter, one might respond that some institutional lenders
are likely to have more sophistication and sensitivity in registration matters than many of the issuers who "go public." The advertising material
of the more aggressive banks leaves the impression that a full service lender
has the capacity to prepare its customers for a public offering; perhaps the
growing tendency by both administrative agencies and courts to insist that
advertising claims be accurate and to impose appropriate sanctions where
they are not, should extend to the securities area as well.
On the other hand, it is obvious that not all banks make similar claims,
and most are probably too constricted in both time and personnel to undertake added supervisory responsibilities. Moreover, the trend towards accountability for misleading advertising is essentially an adjunct to the
strict liability theory in tort, which purports to free the consumer of burdensome evidentiary hurdles and has questionable relevance to the problems of security registration.'
Further, as a matter of state corporate law, a creditor might find that
several of the covenants obtained from a debtor constitute excessive an
therefore unenforceable delegations of director discretion.' 39 An incongruous if not inequitable situation would result if those same covenants
were the basis of inferring a control relationship. The creditor would then
find himself oppressed by obligations which had no corresponding rights.
In light of this analysis, it should be clear that Bank B in the hypothetical situation initially presented should not be held accountable for the
radio to build up the psychology to buy and consume his products. The mere fact that a
manufacturer may thus induce the public to consume unwholesome food was viewed as
evidencing the soundness of a rule which imposes a warranty, as a matter of public policy,
on the sale of food or other products intended for human consumption. Generally, banks have
not been included within the purview of the strict regulations established by the Securities
and Exchange Commission to govern advertising for securities. See Tombstones-The Bane
of FinancialAdvertising, The Boston Sunday Globe, February 10, 1974, at 100. This is not
to say that a bank will not be liable for employing a fraudulent scheme if its misrepresentations are made in connection with the offer or sale of a security, since general anti-fraud
provisions of the Securities Act apply to "any person," 15 U.S.C.A. §77q (1971). A recent
complaint alleging such deceit is Stirling v. First Nat'l Bank, CCH SECuRmEs LAW REPORTER
93,775, which is currently pending in the U.S. district Court for the Southern District of
New York. In situations such as this, the creditor is allegedly responsible for its own misdeeds
rather than those of the debtor, and, having acted outside the scope of normal lending
activities is confronted with possible liability. See also language in the California Civil Code
dealing with misrepresentation, supra, note 57.
139. Cf. W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE: LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §496 (rev. perm.
ed. 1969). An attempt to delegate entire supervision and control of a corporation to a creditor
would be inconsistent with most charter law which requires the directors to have general
authority to control.
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misrepresentations of Company A. Although Company A was in need of
capital for expansion, there is no indication that the market for money was
anything but competitive. Instead of insisting upon equity participation as
a condition of financial support, Bank B offered a highly attractive package, giving itself a stake in Company A's business only to the extent that
a portion of the proceeds from the public offering would be applied to
reduce the outstanding amount on the loan. Each of the restrictions and
special conditions were related to securing repayment rather than sharing
in profits as a co-entrepreneur.
Obviously, the parameters of creditor responsibility are yet to be determined. 10 This article has attempted to propound a theoretical framework
to help determine whether particular provisions in loan agreements give
rise to the type of situation in which the creditor has abandoned his customary role of obtaining security for repayment and has instead attempted
to benefit directly for the profitability of the project being financed. While,
from a practical viewpoint, an increase in the amount of available credit
might well eliminate the bargaining inequities which have given rise to
cases like Connor, it might nevertheless be well for the investor to ponder
the complaint of a southern builder who sought credit from a life insurance
company and was able to obtain it only through a drastic sacrifice of
control: "When the Mafia muscles into a laundry business, it leaves its
partner with more of a stake than these insurance boys are doing.""' Only
the truly unsuspecting lender will attempt to wield such power without a
full awareness of its possible consequences.
140. Indicative of the trend toward expanding the frontiers of responsibility is the federal
grand jury indictment of two outside accountants from the nation's largest accounting firm
in connection with the National Student Marketing case. The firm hurried to the defense of
its partners, saying that "this is the first time that the victims of a crime have been indicted
along with its perpetrators." See Failing Grade, 73 NEWSWEEK 64 (No. 4, Jan. 28, 1974).
141. The Future Largest Landlords in America, supra note 109, at 90.

